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The Art of War
By Sun Tzu
 
 
Translated by Lionel Giles
 
I. Laying Plans
 
1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.
 
2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to
ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be
neglected. 
 
3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to
be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine
the conditions obtaining in the field. 
 
4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander;
(5) Method and discipline. 
 
5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with
their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives,
undismayed by any danger. 
 
7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.
 
8. Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security;
open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.
 
9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely, benevolence,
courage and strictness. 
 
10. By method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of
the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among
the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach
the army, and the control of military expenditure. 
 
11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows
them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.
 
12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the
military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in
this wise:-- 
 
13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?
(2) Which of the two generals has most ability? (3) With whom lie
the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? (4) On which side is
discipline most rigorously enforced? (5) Which army is stronger? (6)
On which side are officers and men more highly trained? (7) In which
army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?
 
14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory
or defeat. 
 
15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will
conquer: let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens
not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:--let such
a one be dismissed! 
 
16. While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of
any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.
 
17. According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's
plans. 
 
18. All warfare is based on deception. 
 
19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our
forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the
enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe
we are near. 
 
20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush
him. 
 
21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in
superior strength, evade him. 
 
22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him.
Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. 
 
23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are
united, separate them. 
 
24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.
 
25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged
beforehand. 
 
26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his
temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes
but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to
victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation
at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is
likely to win or lose. 
 
II. Waging War
 
1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the
field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred
thousand mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them
a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including
entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums
spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces
of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000
men. 
 
2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming,
then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped.
If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.
 
3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State
will not be equal to the strain. 
 
4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength
exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up
to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will
be able to avert the consequences that must ensue. 
 
5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has
never been seen associated with long delays. 
 
6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged
warfare. 
 
7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war
that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.
 
8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are
his supply-wagons loaded more than twice. 
 
9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy.
Thus the army will have food enough for its needs. 
 
10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained
by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army
at a distance causes the people to be impoverished. 
 
11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go
up; and high prices cause the people's substance to be drained away.
 
12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted
by heavy exactions. 
 
13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the
homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their
income will be dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots,
worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears
and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will
amount to four-tenths of its total revenue. 
 
15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One
cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's
own, and likewise a single picul of his provender is equivalent to
twenty from one's own store. 
 
16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger;
that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have
their rewards. 
 
17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have
been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags
should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled
and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be
kindly treated and kept. 
 
18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's own strength.
 
19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.
 
20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter
of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation
shall be in peace or in peril. 
 
III. Attack by Stratagem
 
1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all
is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy
it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire
than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company
entire than to destroy them. 
 
2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence;
supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without
fighting. 
 
3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans;
the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the
next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the
worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. 
 
4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be
avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various
implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling
up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.
 
5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his
men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third
of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are
the disastrous effects of a siege. 
 
6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without
any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them;
he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.
 
7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire,
and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This
is the method of attacking by stratagem. 
 
8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one,
to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous,
to divide our army into two. 
 
9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in
numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we
can flee from him. 
 
10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force,
in the end it must be captured by the larger force. 
 
11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is
complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is
defective, the State will be weak. 
 
12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon
his army:-- 
 
13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant
of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
 
14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers
a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army.
This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds. 
 
15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination,
through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances.
This shakes the confidence of the soldiers. 
 
16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure
to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy
into the army, and flinging victory away. 
 
17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1)
He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. (2) He
will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout
all its ranks. (4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take
the enemy unprepared. (5) He will win who has military capacity and
is not interfered with by the sovereign. 
 
18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you
need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself
but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a
defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb
in every battle. 
 
IV. Tactical Dispositions
 
1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond
the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating
the enemy. 
 
2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the
opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
 
3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat,
but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. 
 
4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able
to do it. 
 
5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat
the enemy means taking the offensive. 
 
6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking,
a superabundance of strength. 
 
7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret
recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from
the topmost heights of heaven. Thus on the one hand we have ability
to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete.
 
8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd
is not the acme of excellence. 
 
9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and
the whole Empire says, "Well done!" 
 
10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see the
sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder
is no sign of a quick ear. 
 
11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only
wins, but excels in winning with ease. 
 
12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor
credit for courage. 
 
13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes
is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering
an enemy that is already defeated. 
 
14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position which
makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating
the enemy. 
 
15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle
after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat
first fights and afterwards looks for victory. 
 
16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres
to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.
 
17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement;
secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly,
Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory. 
 
18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity
to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of
chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.
 
19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's weight
placed in the scale against a single grain. 
 
20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up
waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. 
 
V. Energy
 
1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same principle
as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up
their numbers. 
 
2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different
from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting
signs and signals. 
 
3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's
attack and remain unshaken-- this is effected by maneuvers direct
and indirect. 
 
4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against
an egg--this is effected by the science of weak points and strong.
 
5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle,
but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
 
6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven
and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun
and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they
pass away to return once more. 
 
7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations
of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.
 
8. There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red,
white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than
can ever been seen. 
 
9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt,
sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can
ever be tasted. 
 
10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack--the
direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to
an endless series of maneuvers. 
 
11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It
is like moving in a circle--you never come to an end. Who can exhaust
the possibilities of their combination? 
 
12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even
roll stones along in its course. 
 
13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon
which enables it to strike and destroy its victim. 
 
14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and
prompt in his decision. 
 
15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision,
to the releasing of a trigger. 
 
16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder
and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array
may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
 
17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear
postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.
 
18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question
of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes
a fund of latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effected
by tactical dispositions. 
 
19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains
deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. He sacrifices
something, that the enemy may snatch at it. 
 
20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body
of picked men he lies in wait for him. 
 
21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and
does not require too much from individuals. Hence his ability to pick
out the right men and utilize combined energy. 
 
22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it
were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log
or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on
a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped,
to go rolling down. 
 
23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum
of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height.
So much on the subject of energy. 
 
VI. Weak Points and Strong
 
1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming
of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the
field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted.
 
2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but
does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him. 
 
3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach
of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible
for the enemy to draw near. 
 
4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied
with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force
him to move. 
 
5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly
to places where you are not expected. 
 
6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches
through country where the enemy is not. 
 
7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack
places which are undefended.You can ensure the safety of your defense
if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked. 
 
8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not
know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent
does not know what to attack. 
 
9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be
invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy's
fate in our hands. 
 
10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for
the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if
your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy. 
 
11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement
even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch.
All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged
to relieve. 
 
12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging
us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on
the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable
in his way. 
 
13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible
ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy's
must be divided. 
 
14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up
into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate
parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy's
few. 
 
15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior
one, our opponents will be in dire straits. 
 
16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for
then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several
different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions,
the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately
few. 
 
17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear;
should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen
his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right,
he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he
will everywhere be weak. 
 
18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible
attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make
these preparations against us. 
 
19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate
from the greatest distances in order to fight. 
 
20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will
be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor
the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support
the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are
anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the nearest are separated
by several LI! 
 
21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our
own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of
victory. I say then that victory can be achieved. 
 
22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from
fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of
their success. 
 
23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity.
Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.
 
24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you
may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient.
 
25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain
is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe
from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the
wisest brains. 
 
26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tactics--that
is what the multitude cannot comprehend. 
 
27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can
see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. 
 
28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but
let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.
 
29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural
course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.
 
30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at
what is weak. 
 
31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground
over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation
to the foe whom he is facing. 
 
32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare
there are no constant conditions. 
 
33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and
thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.
 
34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always
equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn.
There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning
and waxing. 
 
VII. Maneuvering
 
1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the
sovereign. 
 
2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend
and harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp.
 
3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing
more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in
turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.
 
4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy
out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach
the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of deviation.
 
5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined
multitude, most dangerous. 
 
6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an
advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other
hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice
of its baggage and stores. 
 
7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make
forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual
distance at a stretch, doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage,
the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of
the enemy. 
 
8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind,
and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.
 
9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will
lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will
reach the goal. 
 
10. If you march thirty LI with the same object, two-thirds of your
army will arrive. 
 
11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is
lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is
lost. 
 
12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the
designs of our neighbors. 
 
13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar
with the face of the country--its mountains and forests, its pitfalls
and precipices, its marshes and swamps. 
 
14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless
we make use of local guides. 
 
15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.
 
16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided
by circumstances. 
 
17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that of
the forest. 
 
18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, is immovability like a
mountain. 
 
19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you
move, fall like a thunderbolt. 
 
20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst
your men; when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments
for the benefit of the soldiery. 
 
21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. 
 
22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. Such
is the art of maneuvering. 
 
23. The Book of Army Management says: On the field of battle, the
spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs
and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence
the institution of banners and flags. 
 
24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears
and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point.
 
25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either
for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone.
This is the art of handling large masses of men. 
 
26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums,
and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing
the ears and eyes of your army. 
 
27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a commander-in-chief
may be robbed of his presence of mind. 
 
28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it
has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning
to camp. 
 
29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is
keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This
is the art of studying moods. 
 
30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and
hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art of retaining self-possession.
 
31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait
at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed
while the enemy is famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's
strength. 
 
32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect
order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident
array:--this is the art of studying circumstances. 
 
33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy,
nor to oppose him when he comes downhill. 
 
34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers
whose temper is keen. 
 
35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. Do not interfere with
an army that is returning home. 
 
36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press
a desperate foe too hard. 
 
37. Such is the art of warfare. 
 
VIII. Variation in Tactics
 
1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the
sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces
 
2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high
roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously
isolated positions. In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem.
In desperate position, you must fight. 
 
3. There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must be
not attacked, towns which must be besieged, positions which must not
be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.
 
4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany
variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops. 
 
5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted